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A VIRTUE-CENTERED APPROACH TO THE BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMONS (OR, THE VIRTUOUS PENGUIN)
David W. Opderbeck • I. INTRODUCTION Intellectual property protection is the key factor for economic growth and advancement in the biotechnology sector. Patents add value to laboratory discoveries and in doing so provide incentives for private sector investment into biotechnology development. The Biotechnology Industry Organization advocates a strong and effective global intellectual property system.
-Biotechnology Industry Organization
The explosion of patenting rather than delivery as a metric for investment in biological sciences, while hinting at great opportunities in the accelerating pace of discovery, has created a thicket of rights, self-reinforcing barriers, and added costs of impediments to innovation.
---Cambia BiOS Initiative
These apparently radically different views about biotechnology intellectual property policy seem to represent a deep division about whether patents and other Intellectual Property Rights (IP Rs) encourage or discourage innovation. This division, however, is in many ways superficial. Although these statements reach very different conclusions, both are based on common utilitarian philosophical and ethical assumptions about IPRs. In particular, both assume that IPRs are fundamentally merely economic tools or instruments that can be evaluated primarily through empirical arguments about the correlation between strong IPRs and rates ofinnovation. Though the empirical conclusions of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) and Cambia represent a fissure between different approaches to IPR policy in biotechnology research, that fissure penetrates only the crust of a larger utilitarian and instrumentalist structure.
The instrumentalist emphasis of the current biotechnology IPR debate is not surprising. In the American tradition, intellectual property law has long been justified primarily by instrumentalist concerns. Thomas Jefferson famously acceded to the "embarrassment" of patent and copyright monopolies because he believed a limited ). An April, 2006 House Report concerning the Bayh-Dole Act recites the Act's alleged successes in similarly instrumentalist terms: the Act, it states, "has helped to catalyze a quarter century of enhanced research and development within the United States and led to dramatic improvements in public health and safety, a strengthened and better resourced higher education system in the U.S., and the development of new domestic industries that have created tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs for proposition that when labor is applied to nature, the value added by the laborer merits a reward.
12
Although the value-added theory is a normative proposition, it is understood in an instrumentalist or consequentialist sense to mean that laborers will only add value to nature if they expect to receive equal value in return from society.
13
The Lockean instrumental argument, Justin Hughes notes, "clearly has dominated official pronouncements on American copyrights and patents."
14
The instrumentalist approach to intellectual property has nearly fully occupied the international sphere. The Trade Related Aspects oflntellectual Property agreement (TRIPS), in particular, reflects the view that the "social purpose" of intellectual property "is to provide protection for the results of investment in the development of new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and development activities."
15
Much of the legal and economic scholarship relating to IPR policy and the biotechnology commons explores this instrumentalist approach. Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg's enormously influential article concerning the biomedical research anticommons was framed in terms of deterrence and incentives to innovation. 16 The debate over the biotechnology anticommons has been framed in terms of whether "exclusive rights in new knowledge will promote scientific progress," or whether "science advances most rapidly when the community enjoys free access to new discoveries." 17 The U.S. Constitution, Rebecca Eisenberg notes in one ofher germinal articles on how patents affect scientific progress, "posits an instrumental justification for patents, allowing Congress to enact patent legislation for the specific purpose of promoting scientific progress." 18 Similarly, scholars such as Mark Lemley and Dan Burk have explored whether tweaking the patent system in various ways would increase incentives to innovate and to develop commercial products in fields such as biotechnology and traditional pharmaceuticals. 
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Some scholars have begun to examine and critique the Lockean instrumentalist basis of intellectual property law more broadly and carefully. Peter Drahos, for example, takes a Rawlsian approach and argues that parties in the original position would seek to minimize proprietary control over information.
20
Drahos views information as a primary good because of information's central role in human planning. 21 Because information is a primary good that is essential to liberty, it should be distributed equally, unless unequal distribution is necessary to benefit the least advantaged members of society. 22 This drives Drahos to an instrumentalist view of information (and property generally), but it is a different instrumentalism than Locke's.
23
For Drahos, an "instrumentalist" view of the law of information means that "law is a tool," which is employed to ensure that the Rawlsian social contract concerning access to information is kept. 24 Drahos thus writes from a legal realist perspective.
25
For Drahos, "[a]n instrumentalism of property does not commit its holder to any specific moral theory or values." 26 Thus, Drahos eschews economic instrumentalism based on Locke, but like many Lockeans, considers proprietary rights in information ( or, as Drahos prefers, proprietary "privileges") only in the context of the specific incentives and externalities such rights might entail.
27
In contrast to these instrumentalist approaches, other theorists have developed the Hegelian theme that property "provides a unique or especially suitable mechanism for self-actualization, for personal expression, and for dignity and recognition as an individual person." 28 In this view, private property is necessary because "to achieve proper self-development-to be a person-an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment."
29 As applied to intellectual property, this notion can take on particular force, because creative expression is an element of one's self. 30 Thus, although an author may alienate copies of her work, she "keeps the Still others have mounted a postmodern critique of the notion of"authorship" that underlies copyrights and patents. These critics argue that intellectual property rules are based on the fiction that an identifiable "author" or "inventor" is responsible for a given creative work or invention and the related fiction that such "authors" or "inventors" can "own" information. "Authorship" or "inventorship," in this reading, is properly considered a communal practice, rather than an individual achievement. It is improper, then, to grant any individual monopoly control over what should remain accessible to the entire community. 33 William Fisher has characterized this as a "social planning theory" of intellectual property. 34 Each of these approaches has merit. The instrumentalist justification has facilitated the rise of technology-rich industries, such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and the postmodern critique appropriately focuses attention on the communal nature of creative and inventive work. But none of them seems complete in itself, and it can be difficult to draw connections between them. Moreover, none of these approaches situates intellectual property into a coherent broader context of human development and flourishing. As a result, the academic debate over intellectual property remains at a stalemate, while in the political arena the utilitarian view prevails because wealthy and powerful corporate interests support it.
We should be able to move past this stalemate. Indeed, there is an ancient understanding of ethics that could integrate the useful themes inherent in existing theories and provide a more robust and humane treatment of intellectual property in society: that of virtue ethics. Legal scholars have just begun to explore the implications of virtue ethics for law and policy and to develop a system of"virtue jurisprudence. " 35 
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This essay is an effort to contribute to this new-but-ancient field of virtue jurisprudence by sketching out some ways in which a virtue ethics approach could relate to the debates over open source biotechnology. In the next section, I will briefly summarize the core themes of contemporary virtue ethics. I will then identify how those themes could relate to the problem of open source biotechnology.
II. WHAT IS VIRTUE ETHICS?
A. Summary of Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics focus on a person's virtues or character more than on the person's individual decisions. 38 The central question for virtue ethics is not so much "did I make the right decision in this situation" as "have I acquired the characteristics of a virtuous person." In this way, virtue ethics is different than deontological ethics, which emphasize adherence to particular ethical rules or precepts, and utilitarian or consequentialist ethics, which examine the consequences of an action to determine whether it, on balance, benefits the public welfare. In virtue ethics, particular actions are examined in relation to how they reflect and inculcate virtue rather than in relation to whether they fall within a rule or maximize welfare. 39 The concept of virtue as the focus of ethics can be traced back to ancient Greek thought. Plato enumerated the four "cardinal" virtues of fortitude, temperance, justice and wisdom. 40 It was Aristotle, however, who developed the virtues into a practical ethical system. 41 In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle developed the concept of eudemonia, or "human flourishing," as the touchstone of ethics.
42 Eudemonia is 42. In the introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states: If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake ( everything else being desired for the sake of this), and ifwe do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Bk. I, ch. 2, http://classics.mit.edu/ Aristotle/nicomachaen.html {last visited Jan. 28, 2007). Later in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes eudemonia (translated here as "happiness," but better translated "flourishing") as follows:
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[Vol. 59:2 achieved when human beings live according to their fullest human potential. The focus of ethical reflection, then, is to encourage the development of character traits, or "virtues," that enable people to achieve their fullest potential. For Artistotle, there were "intellectual" virtues of art, science, intuition, reasoning, and practical wisdom, and the "moral" virtues, which include Plato's four cardinal virtues as well as characteristics like magnanimity.
43
Aristotelian virtue ethics were incorporated into Western thought by Aquinas in connection with natural law theory, as part of the "Aristotelian synthesis.''44 Aquinas recognized the classical virtues, but accorded special status to phronesis, or "practical reason," and added the "spiritual" virtues of faith, hope, and charity.
45
Interest in virtue ethics waned along with the decline of natural law theory during and following the Enlightenment. 46 Ethical theory largely focused instead on consequentialist or deontological models. 47 Starting with Elizabeth Anscombe's pioneering work, however, ethicists such as Anscombe and Philippa Foot reopened the notion of virtue as central to ethical theory. 48 In 1984, the publication of Alisdair Macintyre's After Virtue reignited interest in virtue ethics on a broader scale.
In Maclntyre's view, the "Enlightenment Project" of justifying ethics without regard to virtue failed because it lacked any meaningful notion of teleology. 49 MacIntyre describes ethics as that which seeks to bridge the gap between man-as-he-is Now that we have spoken of the virtues, the forms of friendship, and the varieties of pleasure, what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of happiness, since this is what we state the end of human nature to be. Our discussion will be the more concise ifwe first sum up what we have said already. We said, then, that it is not a disposition; for if it were it might belong to some one who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to some one who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications are unacceptable, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack anything, but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. 
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and man-as-he-ought-to-be. 50 MacIntyre notes that ''the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-herealized-his-te/os."51 Absent such a notion of teleology, moral judgments become something less than "factual statements." 52 Utilitarian ethics attempted to bridge this gap by proposing that ethical judgments are objective statements about individual preferences-or utility and the summation of such preferences-to achieve happiness for the greatest possible number of people. 53 However, MacIntyre notes, it soon became clear that "the notion of human happiness is not a unitary, simple notion and cannot provide us with a criterion for making our key choices. " 54 Thus, ethics began a decline into mere emotivism, in which ethical statements are nothing more than personal expressions of subjective preferences. As MacIntyre puts it, "[t]he history ofutilitarianism thus links historically the eighteenthcentury project of justifying morality and the twentieth century's decline into emotivism." 55 Virtue theory, then, represents an effort to ground ethical reflection in deeper soil than consequentialist or utilitarian theories allow.
B. The Core Axes of Community, Practices, Tradition, and Teleology
There are four core axes around which virtue ethics turns: community, practices, tradition, and teleology. I will summarize each of these axes below, and then will suggest some ways in which they are particularly relevant to biotechnology intellectual property policy.
Community
Virtue ethics are communitarian. The development of individual virtue occurs only within the context of a particular community. The community shapes and defines the "virtues" that are important to the community. The goal of human flourishing is achieved only as a community embodies the virtues.
In Aristotelian thought, the notion of "excellence" is important to the communitarian context in which the virtues are developed and practiced. An analogy can be drawn here to a useful object, such as a hammer. We can ask, ''what characteristics should this object embody in order to function as an excellent hammer?" We might then identify characteristics including the tool's size, weight, balance, and striking surface.
Tied to this concept of community is the notion of life as a "narrative." 56 Narratives reflect the historical arc or telos of a community. MacIntyre places the virtues extolled by Aristotle within the narrative framework of the heroic Greek city- 57 The virtues that were prominent in Aristotle and later Greek thought were those that were necessary to promote the flourishing of the ideal polis.
Practices
A second axis of virtue ethics is that of practices. Virtue ethics does not abjure rules or practices, but the focus is on practices rather than deontological rules. 58 The goal is to identify practices that will enable a community to embody its core virtues. As MacIntyre defines it, a "practice" is:
[A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
59
This definition means that practices entail goods internal to the activity.
60 Such "internal" goods are rewards recognized by practitioners. 61 In addition, practices include "standards of excellence" that, when achieved, give rise to the goods internal to the practice. 62 Finally, practices are "systematically extended," meaning that the practices' standards of excellence, as well as the capabilities of practitioners, rise over time. 
Tradition
A third axis of virtue ethics is that of "tradition." MacIntyre conceives of ''tradition" as "an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."
64 By "historically extended," MacIntyre means that the tradition of a community is a narrative, comprised 57. MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 131-45. 58. Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma have described the relationship between virtue and principles as follows:
The virtuous person is virtuous with respect to this principle [that humans qua humans are owed respect for their ability to make reasoned choices that are their own and that others may not share] not simply because she observes the principle, but because she has not initialized it, made it synonymous with her intentions with respect to other humans, is habitually disposed to respect that principle, and is disposed to do so excellently-that is, as fully as possible. Thus, the virtuous person is not virtuous because she respects the principle, but because she recognizes the fundamental and universal nature of this principle, sees it not just as a duty in the Kantian sense, but as part of her character-incised, so to speak, in the etymological sense of the word "character," into her very person and identity. 
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66 Individuals within communities pledge allegiance to the text or voice that provides authoritative structure to the community.
67 Yet, the community's narrative is not stagnant because new generations of community members continually reinterpret the tradition and apply it to contemporary circumstances. 68 In this way, over time, a living tradition represents a broad narrative that has weathered various challenges and crises. 
Teleology
A final aspect of virtue ethics that is particularly suitable to the analysis of open source biotechnology is that of teleology. In a sense, teleology is not really a separate axis of virtue ethics, but rather is inherent in the axes of community, practices, and tradition already discussed. In fact, virtue ethics can be broadly considered as a form of teleological ethics, in that ethics is a process that moves the community towards the goal of human flourishing.
Although virtue ethics is teleological, it should not be equated with consequentialism generally, or utilitarianism in particular. Indeed, one of the motivations for focusing on virtue ethics and biotechnology innovation policy is to move the discussion out of its utilitarian rut.
It can of course be useful to attend to power relationships, utility preferences, and consequences of individual utility maximization when analyzing the legal regulation of biotechnology innovation. In fact, in a virtue ethics context, such considerations must be attended to given the importance of phronesis (practical wisdom) as a virtue. The problem, however, is that utilitarian approaches have dominated the legal scholarship, without a broader conception of why we should be concerned, as an ethical matter, about the deadweight losses caused by biotechnology patents or the effects ofa putative patent-induced anti commons. As MacIntyre notes, there is nothing connecting the humans-as-we-are with the humans-as-we-should-be. 70 Moreover, as MacIntyre and many other critics of consequentialist ethics also note, it is impossible to simplify even one person's utility to a basic function, much less to do so in complex political and cultural settings in which competing utilities seem incommensurable. In contrast, the teleology of human flourishing inherent in virtue ethics is a fullyorbed concept. It includes utility maximization functions, but is more than the sum of such functions. This is because virtue ethics starts with a broad conception of ''the good" and then works backwards to the individual virtues that will support practices within communities progressing towards the good. The hope is to develop narratives, practices, examples, frameworks, and contexts that foster the internal development of virtue, rather than merely enforcing external rules that discipline preferences.
In this regard, virtue ethics also should be distinguished from ethical systems that are primarily deontological. Deontological ethics emphasize adherence to duty.
72
Within liberal democratic states, the sort of social contract theory attributed to John Rawls can be viewed as a type of deontological ethic that emphasizes adherence to contract-like duties. 73 In Rawls's view, the preferences of different social groups are incommensurable, such that society only coheres through a shared commitment to a small number of basic rules that comprise the social contract. Most of these rules relate to the scope of individual rights. Virtue ethics, in contrast, is unwilling to give up on a broader notion of community.
III. How CAN VIRTUE ETHICS BE APPLIED TO BIOTECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY? (THE VIRTUOUS PENGUIN) 74
There presently exists no framework for how virtue ethics could apply to intellectual property. The core virtue ethics axes of community, practices, tradition, and teleology, however, seem conducive to current discussions surrounding biotechnology. In the following sub-sections, I discuss how virtue ethics can relate broadly to open source methods of production, and then develop some themes in environmental and health care virtue ethics that can be applied to open source biotechnology.
A. Virtue Ethics and Open Source Production Generally
The 
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76 For example, a coder working on an open source software project might participate, at least in part, for the joy and satisfaction inherent in creating an elegant solution to a technical problem. 77 In addition, mature open source projects do not proceed aimlessly, but include standards of excellence established by the community and usually canonized by an influential individual or small group of individuals. 78 Finally, a pillar of open source production is the systematic extension of the project through the continuous feedback provided by numerous distributed workers. But open source communities should not be conceived of as fractiously individualistic. A successful, long term open source community requires an authoritative voice or voices that regulate exchange, lend status to social-psychological rewards, and canonize valuable contributions to the project. 82 Open source production can indeed sometimes provide more space for individual creativity and expression than traditional hierarchical production, but such creativity and expression should be conceived in terms of virtues that lend themselves to communal practices, with such practices embedded in the narrative tradition of the community.
Once open source communities are conceived in Maclntyrian terms, it is possible to identify virtues that support the flourishing of such communities. Benkler and Nissenbaum identify three "clusters" of virtues that relate to peer production: (1) "autonomy, independence, liberation"; 83 (2) "creativity, productivity, industry"; 84 (3) "benevolence, charity, generosity, altruism"; 85 The first cluster seems difficult to relate to the communitarian axis of virtue ethics. As an example of the "virtue" of autonomy, Benkler and Nissenbaum propose "independence from the wide-ranging commercial entities influencing our actions and choices as well as from the typical array of institutional entities, whether employers, banks, agents of government, or whoever." 87 In his important book The Wealth of Networks, Benkler stresses autonomy as a fundamental value promoted by open source production, but not from a virtue ethics framework. 88 In The Wealth of Networks, Benkler seems to approach the question of autonomy from a Kantian perspective.
89
"Autonomy" seems better suited to the Kantian perspective Benkler takes in The Wealth of Networks than to the virtue ethics approach he takes with Nissenbaum. It may be true that commons-based production increases individual autonomy by providing alternatives to information flows produced by traditional commercial providers. But individual autonomy should not be conceived as a "virtue." Rather, some notion of autonomy may be a component of the eudemonia toward which the virtues direct human practices. And the virtues, as instantiated in practices and traditions, are never merely self-directed. Practices and traditions are by definition communal, not merely individual.
A better approach to the question of autonomy within a virtue ethics framework of open source production would be to focus on the virtue of "respect" for the autonomy of others. If human flourishing requires that people have some capacity to make autonomous choices, then respecting the choices of others, and fostering communities in which such choices can be exercised, is an important virtue. 90 Viewed this way, it is possible to identify practices and traditions that embody this virtue. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 75, at 141-42 ("As a means of diagnosing the conditions of individual freedom in a given society and context, we must seek to observe the extent to which people are, in fact, able to plan and pursue a life that can reasonably be described as a product of their own choices .... It is in this sense that the increased range of actions we can imagine for ourselves in loose affiliation with others ... increases our ability to imagine and pursue life plans that would have been impossible in the recent past.").
89. See BENKLER, supra note 75, at 133-175. Benkler argues that "(t]he structure of our information environment is constitutive of our autonomy, not only functionally significant to it." Id. at 147. Open source production enhances autonomy because it alters the power structure of the information environment and devolves more control to the individual. See, e.g., id. at 161 ("By offering alternative transactional frameworks for alternative information flows, these [ commons-based/open source] networks substantially and qualitatively increase the freedom of individuals to perceive the world through their own eyes, and to form their own perceptions of what options are open to them and how they might evaluate alternative courses of action.").
90. There is, of course, significant room for discussion about the nature, extent, and role of individual autonomy in a flourishing community. It is difficult to conceive of a virtue ethic with a primarily individualistic teleology. Indeed, one of the attractions of virtue ethics is its rejection of the excessive individualism associated with the Enlightenment approach to morality. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 42, at 51-61 ("Why the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality Had to Fail").
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Benkler and Nissenbaum's focus on "creativity, productivity, [and] industry" seems closer to the heart of virtue ethics. 91 They helpfully note that creativity, productivity, and industry can be considered part ofa Maclntyrian "practice. "
92 Peer production provides additional avenues for individuals to engage in creative and productive work, and thus can facilitate valuable practices.
93
In addition, Benkler and Nissenbaum note that peer production encourages the "other-regarding" virtues of "benevolence, charity, generosity, [and] altruism." 94 Participants in open source communities give time, resources, and talents to the project, ordinarily without direct financial remuneration. 95 As Benkler and Nissenbaum note, however, the literature concerning open source culture is ambiguous concerning whether participants offer their time, resources, and talents for altruistic reasons or as part of an essentially self-interested medium of exchange.
96
Finally, Benkler and Nissenbaum focus on the virtues of"sociability, camaraderie, friendship, cooperation[, and] civic virtue." 97 It is here that their link between virtue ethics and peer production is perhaps most salient. This cluster of virtues involves providing resources to a community engaged in a common project with a common goal. The concept is similar, Benkler and Nissenbaum note, to the American founders' notion of politics as contribution to the public good. 98 Whatever their psychological motives, the multifarious contributors to an open source project provide small inputs of time, resources, and talent, which cumulate to a much larger good.
B. Virtue and Biotechnology as an Environmental and Public Health Community
If virtue ethics concepts can apply generally to open source production, can they apply to biotechnology, and specifically to open source biotechnology? Benkler and Nissenbaum argue that the ethical implications of any technology include not only the uses to which a purportedly "neutral" technology is put, but also the manner in which the technology's architecture and functionality affect those uses. 99 Here they helpfully draw on technology and society theorists such as Marshall McLuhan and Lewis Mumford. 100 Open source production, Benkler and Nissenbaum suggest, structurally incorporates virtues that lead to greater human freedom. Ifwe fail to encourage open source production, "[ w ]e might miss the chance to benefit from a distinctive sociotechnical system that promotes not only cultural and intellectual production but constitutes a venue for human character development." architecture across such computer information networks. Similarly, one could suggest that biological organisms are controlled at least to some extent by genetic code, and that those who are able to control genetic code through biotechnology will be able to control the organism, including people. The distribution of control over genetic code across peer production networks then could represent a means of democratizing control over life itself.
I have previously noted a number of difficulties with this approach. 103 In particular, it is not so simple to tease out a "code layer" in a living organism that might be amenable to peer production. 104 Although DNA is a type of code, it is far more complex than a typical computer program, and the hardware and craft knowledge needed to isolate and manipulate genetic code is not widely available. 105 Nevertheless, there may be a role for open source production in biotechnology at the broad level of basic research and large-scale genomic databases and at the level of certain enabling technologies.
106 For example, the Cambia "BIOS" initiative and the HapMap project represent steps in this direction. And, it is at this level of basic "upstream" research that fears of a biotechnology anticommons are most tractable. The deadweight loss of patent protection in this arena can represent significant human suffering.
The debates about biotechnology patents, then, are essentially debates about information-code-that concerns public health. We are concerned about access to biotechnology and biotechnology innovation because of the immense promise and perils of this technology as it relates to human health. Biotechnology could hold the key to a cure for AIDS or the safe disposal of the world's toxic waste. It also could generate vast waves of environmental and social disruption, for example, if non-fertile genetically modified crops hybridize with indigenous food supplies and render them sterile.
In this regard, it should be clear that, from a virtue ethics perspective, it is not enough to treat biotechnology as simply a product in a market. Although the products of biotechnology practice can be commodified and traded in markets, and although such markets can be an important component in biotechnology policy, markets are not the raison d'etre of biotechnology.
Biotechnology, then, is more than a set of products; it is a Maclntyrian practice that seeks to improve human health and wellbeing. In his keynote address at BIO 
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serve the uncountable billions of humans who will inhabit this planet after we are gone." 107 Greenwood expressed the biotechnology community's vision, hyperbolicaJJy but no doubt sincerely, as follows:
The convergence of systems biology, genomics, infomatics, proteomics, nanotechnology and personalized medicine bring us to the threshold of a new era: In the biotech century, using genetically enhanced crops, we will better feed an increasingly hungry world. In the biotech century, we will harness enzymes to convert plant waste to fuel and to biodegradable plastics, reducing our dependence on oil. In the biotech century, we will be able to outpace the tortures of[D]arwinian natural selection and its afflictions of disease. There is no more noble-and no more heroic-mission than this.
108
Greenwood's sentiments are echoed--even amplified-in a promotional video produced by BIO entitled "Biotechnology: Knowledge Serving Life." 109 The video adopts the elegiac tone ofa science museum film or public television documentary and intercuts brief comments from cancer and cystic fibrosis patients, optimistic and earnest talking-head scientists projected against CS I-like blue-tinted backgrounds filled with wiggling microorganisms, and colorful images of Midwestern farms and Asian village weJls. The narration borders on messianic. At the video's close, the narrator teJJs us:
Dreams begin with inspiration and flourish with determination and courage. Such are the dreams of today's biotechnology leaders. Their dream of improving the human condition offers hope to those who suffer, relief to those who are ill, and fullness of life to those we love. Within our reach is a future unimaginable a generation ago. Think of a world where starvation is replaced with healthful diets, where manufacturing products and energy are made with natural renewable resources, where our environment is preserved for tomorrow's generations. Biotechnology: furthered by faithfully exploring the unknown and boldly embracing the possible. The world's great new frontier is upon us.
110
The video includes similar teleological comments from industry leaders. For example, Dr. Leroy Hood, President of the Institute for Systems Biology, says:
If the mission of man is to make suffering less, if the mission of man is to deal with hunger and starvation, and if the mission of man is to educate and to better the population, I would argue that the kinds of technologies that we're talking about here are going to be utterly key in the future for doing that. 
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A VIRTUE-CENTERED APPROACH 333 environment is conducive to the actor's health and to the enjoyment of natural resources. 121 Such enjoyment includes not only the use of things like clean air and water, but also the aesthetic experience of unpolluted spaces.
122
Another approach is to study the character of environmental role models.
123 Such role models provide examples of character traits comprising environmental virtue. Telling the stories of such role models inculcates those virtues in the life of the community. 124 Finally, environmental virtue can be grounded in concepts ofhuman excellence. 125 Under this framework, a virtue is something that enables human beings to flourish. The virtues of generosity and charity, for example, enable individuals to contribute to the social groups to which they belong, and thereby enhance individual well-being. 
Virtue Ethics and Health Care
Virtue ethics as applied to health care primarily focuses on the character traits of a virtuous practitioner given the ends of medical practice. 127 For example, Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking have suggested that a doctor's role must be defined in regard to the teleology of medical practice, which is the promotion ofhuman health. 128 An "ethical" doctor is one who possesses the character traits or virtues that support this practice. 129 Oakley and Cocking identify these virtues as beneficence, truthfulness, trustworthiness, courage, and humility. 130 A physician who possesses these virtues will put the patient's needs above herown, provide patients with accurate information, keep patient confidences and respect patient autonomy, seek the patient's good despite 121 perhaps what we have to learn from heroic societies is twofold: first that all morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular and that the aspirations of the morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion; and secondly that there is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors in which series heroic societies hold first place. Beneficence is "a disposition to focus on the patient's own psychophysical needs, and to distinguish which procedures are genuinely necessary for the patient's health and which would be excessive (and so to avoid 'defensive medicine'), and to desire the removal of the patient's impairment, for the patient's own sake, along with a sensitivity and tactfulness in dealing with the vulnerabilities common to sick people." Id. at 92-93.
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phronesis. 144 A physician in whom such virtues have become ingrained will tend to observe Beauchamp and Childress's four principles, but will also extend and go beyond those principles towards a more holistic relationship to her patients and participation in the medical community.
C. Applications of Open Source, Environmental, and Health Care Virtue Ethics to Biotechnology
Against this background of how virtue ethics has been applied to open source communities, environmental problems, and health care, it is possible to identify several themes that can support a virtue ethics approach to open source biotechnology.
First, biotechnology is part of a broader community of science. We should ask, ''what characteristics are embodied in the biotechnology community that, if developed, will enable it to function as an excellent scientific/public health community?" The communitarian focus of virtue ethics maps well onto the ideal of biotechnology research as a community of science. The communitarian focus also encourages us to think about what sort of community we want the biotechnology community to become.
As we consider biotechnology as a community, we can focus on the practices that support the virtues integral to that community. Here, the concepts of"internal goods," "standards of excellence," and "systematic extension" are inherent both in communities of science as well as in open source communities. The environmental virtue ethics concept of "agent benefit" also meshes well with this teleological, practice-oriented view of biotechnology. The biotechnology practitioner seeks ways to produce healthier, more abundant crops, or to eliminate the polluting by-products of farm or industrial activities. 145 The extension of these practices moves the community closer to its te/os.
Likewise, the health care virtue ethics concept of the virtuous practitioner applies to those engaged in the practice of biotechnology. The virtues identified by Oakley and Cocking in reference to medical doctors can apply to biotechnology researchers, although with a different focus. While the question whether a medical doctor is a beneficent, truthful and trustworthy practitioner is defined largely in relation to the patient, the biotechnology researcher is defined in relation to the scientific research community and the public. A truthful and trustworthy researcher, for example, will 144 . Id. at 84-91. 145. As BIO, the biotechnology industry's leading trade group, notes, "[w]hen people are asked what they think of when they hear the word biotechnology, they respond with phrases like 'biomedical research,' 'breakthrough medicines,' 'cures' and 'hope for the future.' Health care is, after all, the number one market for biotechnology. 
